Capital flows, commodity price movements and foreign exchange intervention by Renzo Rossini et al.
BIS Papers No 57  261
 
 
Capital flows, monetary policy and forex intervention in Peru 
Renzo Rossini, Zenón Quispe and Donita Rodríguez
1 
Introduction 
This article describes the main features of sterilised intervention in the foreign exchange 
market by the Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCR), in the context of an economy with a 
financial system that operates with two currencies. The ability of local banks to extend credit 
in foreign currency complicates the normal transmission mechanisms of monetary policy 
because, on the one hand, the policy rate cannot affect those flows, and, on the other, a 
sharp depreciation can produce a credit contraction due to the deterioration of the quality of 
bank assets linked to balance sheet effects on the partially dollarised non-financial private 
sector portfolio of assets and liabilities. 
As a result of the risks and vulnerabilities related to partial dollarisation, the BCR has 
adopted a policy framework that employs, in addition to the conventional policy rate, several 
instruments that can be classified as quantitative or unconventional. For example, higher 
reserve requirements on short-term foreign exchange liabilities are used to modulate this 
source of credit, but the BCR intervenes in the foreign exchange market, sterilising the 
excess liquidity with its own instruments that are restricted to local participants. Foreign 
exchange intervention is aimed at reducing the volatility of the exchange rate and 
accumulating international reserves, while avoiding signalling or committing to a particular 
level or tendency of the exchange rate. 
This policy framework has allowed the BCR to prevent major disruptions due to the recent 
global financial crisis and to maintain the flow of credit during the turbulence. Additionally, the 
conventional transmission mechanism is in place with the interest rate as the instrument 
used to control inflation. 
In this article we discuss four issues related to this policy framework. First, we examine the 
selection of a discretionary type of forex intervention vis-à-vis a rule-based one. Second, we 
review the issues related to sterilisation with respect to its cost, the instruments used and the 
degree of access by non-residents. Third, we consider the use of reserve requirements as a 
complement to the conventional policy rate tool. Finally, we assess the issue of 
competitiveness in an environment marked by strong capital flows. 
Monetary policy under partial dollarisation 
Persistent high inflation and severe macroeconomic imbalances in Peru during the 1970s 
and 1980s, along with a lack of inflation-adjusted instruments, led households to hold foreign 
currency as a store of value. This process of financial dollarisation increased significantly 
during the hyperinflation of 1988–90. In the years that followed, a wide-ranging package of 
reforms to the financial system and the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy was introduced 
to stabilise the economy. After achieving macroeconomic stabilisation during the 1990s, in 
2002 the BCR implemented a fully fledged inflation targeting regime with an initial target of 
2.5% and, since 2007, a continuous target of 2.0%, both with a tolerance range of ±1%. As a 
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result, during the last decade the average annual inflation rate has been 2.3%. However, 
despite improved economic conditions and stable macroeconomic fundamentals during the 
last 20 years, inertia, transaction costs and a still underdeveloped capital market have led to 
a slow but continuous decline in the percentage of deposits and credits in US dollars, from a 
peak of 82% in 1999 to 44% in 2010 (Graph 1). 
Graph 1 
Peru: credit dollarization 1993 – 2010 
As percentage of total credit 
 
Dollarisation amplifies the reaction of financial intermediaries to sharp movements in their 
funding or high exchange rate volatility. As a result, the economy is prone to credit booms 
and busts associated with flows of foreign currency deposits, foreign credit lines or other 
capital flows; and to exchange rate movements that affect the quality of the credit portfolio. 
Dollarisation therefore alters the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and increases 
the liquidity and solvency risks of the financial system: 
  The maturity mismatch generated in foreign currency introduces higher liquidity 
risks. 
  Solvency risk increases when the assets of non-financial economic agents are 
mainly denominated in domestic currency while their liabilities are dollar-
denominated. 
After various external shocks, especially the 1998 Russian crisis, the BCR designed an 
action plan to prevent a credit contraction during episodes of financial stress. The monetary 
policy framework in Peru, in addition to the common features of an inflation targeting regime, 
began to include a set of measures to deal with the risks related to financial dollarisation. The 
strategy included three levels of liquidity: accumulation of international reserves by the BCR; 
high liquidity requirements of financial intermediaries; and a solid public sector financial 
position. In line with this strategy, international reserves increased from 12.9% of GDP in 
December 1994 to 28.8% in December 2010 (Graph 2).  




Peru: net international reserves 
In millions of US dollars and as percentage of GDP 
 
 
This set of monetary policy instruments can be divided into the normal price instrument of the 
interest rate and unconventional quantitative tools such as reserve requirements or the 
structure of the central bank balance sheet. The importance of the latter group of policies has 
gained attention due to central banks’ innovative actions during the financial crisis, which 
aimed to prevent or limit a collapse of credit. The motivation for considering measures which 
act more directly on the flow of credit – rather than waiting for the more indirect impact of 
changes in interest rates – is that during credit booms or crunches, short-term interest rates 
become less effective at signalling the stance of monetary policy to financial intermediaries, 
which become insensitive to policy actions based on movements in the interest rate but more 
inclined to react to changes in expectations and risk appetite. 
Quantitative instruments are part of a broader risk management approach of monetary policy 
that includes preventive and corrective measures intended to prevent a credit boom or 
crunch and to preserve financial stability and the transmission mechanisms of monetary 
policy. Graph 3 illustrates the common transmission mechanism of monetary policy, affecting 
inflation through changes in the short-term interest rate and the impact on the output gap, 
along with the effect of unconventional quantitative policies on banking credit and thus on the 
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The BCR’s interventions in the forex market aim to reduce the volatility of the exchange rate 
without signalling or committing to a certain level of the rate. A predictable exchange rate 
would in practice represent a pegged exchange rate system, and would ensure the success 
of one-sided bets by speculators, thus making intervention fruitless. One way to prevent 
predictability and to reinforce the central bank’s commitment to price stability is to use a rule-
type intervention, based, for example, on announced amounts of purchases of foreign 
exchange in the market. However, it is possible for events to render intervention either 
unnecessary or insufficient, forcing the central bank to abandon or change the rule. 
Alternatively, a more discretionary type of intervention may be used in which the central bank 
has a clear idea that it is important to avoid signalling an exchange rate and is willing and 
able to engage in forex operations without an announced amount of operations. 
Forex intervention occurs mainly through direct operations with commercial banks in the spot 
market and at the prevailing exchange rate. Additionally, when the forwards market in foreign 
currency is putting pressure on the exchange positions of local banks the BCR can conduct 
swaps through temporary purchases or sales of foreign currency, using an auction 
procedure. At maturity the swaps can be renewed or exercised, either of which has the same 
characteristics as an intervention in the market. 
Graph 4 illustrates the timing and types of forex intervention by the BCR together with 
changes in the exchange rate since 2007. Three clear episodes can be identified: (i) before 
the Lehman Brothers collapse, (ii) after the collapse; and (iii) after the announcement of the BIS Papers No 57  265
 
 
second round of quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve (QE2). The graph also identifies 
direct intervention in the foreign exchange spot market, and the placements or maturing 
swap operations. During these three stages, the central bank did not attempt to reverse the 
tendencies, but sought to reduce the degree of volatility. It can also be noted that the daily 
amount of interventions does not follow any rule. 
 
Graph 4 
Peru: exchange rate and central bank net forex intervention 
In new soles per US dollar and millions of US dollars 
 
 
Table 1 shows the three recent stages of surges and contractions of capital flows, how they 
materialised in the exchange markets and the amount of forex intervention by the BCR. 
There were $8.7 billion in purchases before Lehman and $6.5 billion (including $0.2 billion in 
swaps) at the time of the first signs of normalisation and the announcement and 
implementation of QE2. In contrast, during the period of acute crisis in the last quarter of 
2009, the BCR sold $4.8 billion – $8.0 billion if we include the $3.2 billion in balances at 
maturity of swaps. 
The BCR’s forex intervention has been effective in reducing the volatility of the new sol. As 
Graph 5 shows, the Peruvian currency has been very stable in comparison with those of 
other countries in the region. The coefficient of variability has been close to 4%, whereas for 




Peru: spot and forward foreign exchange markets
1 
In millions of US dollars  
Pre-Lehman Post-Lehman 
Capital inflows to 
emerging markets 
Deepest stage of 
the crisis and QE1 
Full recovery in 
emerging markets 
and QE2   






Pension funds  –1,596  2,541  –768 
Spot –171  968  332 
Forward –1,425  1,573  –1,100 
Non-resident investors  –1,013  1,944  –1,871 
Spot –2,388  1,604  –1,932 
Forward 1,376  339  61 
Other residents  –6,119  3,499  –3,830 
Private, non financial  –6,119  2,489  –4,450 
Financial institutions  –1  1,010  619 
Central bank interventions  8728  –7,984  6,469 
1  Positive figures imply net demand and negative figures net supply, positions. 
 
Graph 5 
Nominal exchange rate 
Variability coefficient, SD/average 




To avoid side effects of forex intervention on the ability to control inflation, the central bank 
needs sufficient capacity for sterilisation. Two crucial factors helped to accomplish this goal 
in Peru: a solid fiscal position and the increasing demand for monetary base. In Table 2, a 
simplified BCR balance sheet is presented in terms of percentages of GDP; note that fiscal 
deposits represent 10% of GDP, which is about 35% of the size of international reserves. 
The fiscal contribution to sterilise the liquidity created by foreign exchange intervention also 
helps to reduce pressure on the real exchange rate. 
 
Table 2 
Balance sheet of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru 
As percentage of GDP 
Assets  Liabilities 
Net international reserves  28.8%  Treasury deposits  10.3% 
    Central bank securities  1.8% 
    Term deposits of banks  4.2% 
    Reserve requirements  6.1% 
    Other liabilities  1.0% 
    Currency (notes and coins)  5.4% 
 
Sterilised interventions should not affect the ability to use the short-term interest rate as a 
policy tool. To assess the impact of forex intervention on the variability of the interest rate, we 
calculated the ratio of the volatility of the interbank interest rate to the variability of the 
exchange rate in selected economies with a floating exchange rate. Graph 6 shows that Peru 
has the lowest ratio. 
Graph 6 
Interest rate volatility 
Relative to exchange rate volatility 
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Another concern related to sterilisation is the financial cost from the carry cost or interest rate 
differential between the returns on international reserves and the interest paid on the 
liabilities of the central bank. When local interest rates are higher, the central bank could face 
losses. One component that eases this burden is the currency, which is an interest-free 
liability. As shown in Graph 7, the return on foreign assets held by the BCR exceeds the 




Central bank NIR yields and cost of funds 
 
 
Finally, sterilised interventions can create an incentive for additional capital inflows due to the 
differential between the local and international interest rates. This could neutralise monetary 
policy, either by paralysing the use of the policy rate or by attracting further foreign financing. 
These capital flows have as an additional incentive the expectation of appreciation of the 
local currency. 
The recent surges in capital inflows in Peru before the Lehman collapse and with QE2 were 
reflected in the growth in demand by non-residents for different financial instruments in local 
currency, including the sterilisation paper of the central bank. To avoid the circularity of 
sterilised intervention attracting more capital inflows, the central bank: (i) imposed a 4% fee 
on purchases or sales of BCR paper to participants other than local financial institutions, in 
order to limit resale to non-residents; (ii) increased to 120% the reserve requirement on local 
currency deposits for non-residents; and (iii) substituted certificates of term deposits as 
sterilisation instruments to prevent the resale of other instruments in local currency to non-
residents and their subsequent replacement by BCR paper. 
                                                  
2   There is no consensus about the accounting treatment of exchange rate losses generated by a currency 
appreciation on international reserves valued in local currency. Some central banks register them in the profit 
and loss report, and others as a separate item in the capital account. From an economic point of view, the 
change of valuation in local currency of international reserves is not relevant, as it would be meaningless to 
register and distribute dividends from a currency depreciation that increases the nominal amount of 
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In addition, the Superintendency of Banks (SBS) and the Treasury have put macroprudential 
measures in place. The SBS cut the limit on long net foreign positions of banks from 75% to 
60%, limited the amount of daily and weekly forex operations by pension funds, and recently 
pre-published a regulation limiting banks’ long position in derivatives to 40% of their net 
worth. 
On the other hand, the Treasury has taxed the capital gains generated by forward contracts 
at a rate of 30%, and recently issued on the international market bonds denominated in 
domestic currency but paid in foreign currency, an operation that increased demand for 
foreign currency by domestic agents that purchased those bonds. In 2010, the BCR 
increased the limit on pension funds’ foreign investment from 17% to 30%. 
Reserve requirements 
The accumulation of foreign currency liquidity by financial intermediaries has been 
determined mainly by macroprudential policies. In particular, the BCR uses reserve 
requirements to manage capital flows and at the same time accumulate a buffer stock of 
international reserves. For instance, during the capital inflow episode in the first quarter of 
2008, the central bank raised domestic and foreign currency reserve requirements and 
implemented a series of other measures aimed at discouraging holdings of central bank 
instruments by non-resident investors. The rate of marginal domestic currency reserve 
requirements was raised from 6.0% to 25.0% (Table 3), reserve requirements for deposits of 
non-residents were increased to 120% and marginal reserve requirements in foreign 
currency were raised from 30% to 49%.
3 
Also, due to the quantitative easing in the developed world, there was a resurgence of capital 
inflows during the second part of 2010. In this case, the BCR again raised reserve 
requirements, to 25% in domestic currency, 55% in foreign currency and 75% for the external 
short-term liabilities of the financial system. The central bank also reinstated the reserve 
requirement ratio for domestic currency deposits of non-residents, setting it at 120%. In 
addition, observing an increase in lending to the domestic market from domestic bank 
subsidiaries abroad, the BCR included their liabilities within the total liabilities subject to 
reserve requirements.
4 
                                                  
3   During the intensification of the global financial crisis in the fourth quarter of 2008, the reserve requirements 
were reduced in order to prevent a credit contraction.  
4  In September 2007, the central bank eliminated the reserve requirements for external loans of commercial 
banks with maturities of two years or more in order to extend their maturities. The longer-term external funding 




Monetary policy interest rate and reserve requirements ratios, 2006–11 
  Reserve requirements ratios 
  Foreign currency 
 
Domestic currency 
General regime   External liabilities
   



































I. Pre-Lehman: capital inflows and inflationary pressures in emerging markets 
May 06  4.50%  6.0%        30%      30%  30% 
Jul 07  4.75%  6.0%        30%      30%  30% 
Sep 07  5.00%  6.0%        30%      30%  0% 
Jan 08  5.25%  6.0%        30%      30%  0% 
Mar 08  5.25%  8.0%  15.0%    15.0%  40%      40%  0% 
Apr 08  5.50%  9.0%  20.0%    40.0%  45%      45%  0% 
Jun 08  5.75%  9.0%  20.0%    40.0%  45%      45%  0% 
Jul 08  6.00%  9.0%  25.0%    120.0%  49%      49%  9% 
Aug 08  6.25%  9.0%  25.0%    120.0%  49%      49%  9% 
Sep 08  6.50%  9.0%  25.0%    120.0%  49%      49%  9% 
II. Post-Lehman and QE1 
Post-Lehman: deepest stage of the crisis and QE1 
Oct 08  6.50%  9.0%      120%  35%      0%  0% 
Dec 08  6.50%  7.5%      35%  30%      0%  0% 
Feb 09  6.25%  7.5%      35%  30%      0%  0% 
Mar 09  6.00%  6.0%      35%  30%      0%  0% 
Post-Lehman: quick recovery of emerging markets and QE1 
Apr 09  5.00%  6.0%      35%  30%      0%  0% 
May 09  4.00%  6.0%      35%  30%      0%  0% 
Jun 09  3.00%  6.0%      35%  30%      0%  0% 
Jul 09  2.00%  6.0%      35%  30%      0%  0% 
Aug 09  1.25%  6.0%      35%  30%      0%  0% 
Dec 09  1.25%  6.0%      35%  30%      0%  0% 
Feb 10  1.25%  6.0%      35%  30%      35%  0% 
III. Post-Lehman: full recovery in emerging markets and QE2 
May 10  1.50%  6.0%      35%  30%      35%  0% 
Jun 10  1.75%  6.0%      35%  30%      35%  0% 
Jul 10  2.00%  7.0%      40%  35%      40%  0% 
Aug 10  2.50%  8.0%  12%    50%  45%  0.10%    50%  0% 
Sep 10  3.00%  8.5%  15%    120%  50%  0.20%    65%  0% 
Oct 10  3.00%  9.0%  25%    120%  55%  0.20%    75%  0% 
Nov 10  3.00%  9.0%  25%    120%  55%      75%  0% 
Dec 10  3.00%  9.0%  25%    120%  55%      75%  0% 
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Rossini and Quispe (2010) describe the 1999–2001 credit crunch in Peru as being caused by 
the combination of an initial surge in capital inflows and a subsequent expansion of banking 
credit, followed by a sharp contraction of credit due to a sudden stop of capital flows in 
conjunction with a sharp currency depreciation stemming from the 1998 Russian crisis. 
Graph 8 shows banking credit as a proportion of GDP, including a band of ±2% constructed 
around a series smoothed with a Hodrick-Prescott filter, which can be used to identify 
periods of excessive credit expansion or contraction. Since the recovery from the financial 
crisis, credit has remained inside this band. 
Graph 8 
Peru: credit–GDP ratio 1993 – 2010 
Annual ratios from quarterly data, in percentages 
 
 
Real exchange rates 
The nominal appreciation of the exchange rate caused by capital inflows raised concerns 
about the negative effect of this situation on tradable sectors. To assess this impact, we 
review real exchange rate data and evaluate the deviations from the equilibrium real 
exchange rate. In both instances, it is clear that the surge in capital inflows has not had a 
major negative effect on competitiveness in the case of Peru. 
In Graph 9, we present the real effective exchange rate (REER) index and observe that it has 
been within ±5% of the average level for 1993–2010. This relative stability of the real 
exchange rate can be confirmed in international comparisons. Table 4 shows the 
comparative coefficient of variability for 22 countries; the REER of the new sol is the third 
least volatile for the period December 1994–December 2010, and the least volatile for the 
shorter period of January 2001–December 2010.  




Real effective exchange rate 

















Brazil  21.3%  22.7%  United States  8.0%  7.8% 
Czech 
Republic  20.9%  11.5%  Israel  9.2%  6.3% 
South Africa  14.1%  12.2%  Thailand  10.2%  7.0% 
Korea  11.9%  11.9%  Euro area  7.3%  5.3% 
Indonesia  19.1%  7.8%  Chile  7.7%  6.9% 
Philippines  11.6%  11.3%  Sweden  7.7%  5.4% 
Australia  12.3%  10.5%  India  4.6%  4.5% 
Canada  10.8%  9.9%  Malaysia  9.5%  3.7% 
Japan  13.9%  9.0%  Switzerland  4.9%  4.0% 
United 
Kingdom  9.3%  9.7%  Singapore  5.4%  3.7% 
Mexico  12.7%  8.4%  Peru  5.1%  3.6% 
1  Calculations based on the BIS effective exchange rate indices. 
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We use the behavioural equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) method to estimate the 
equilibrium real exchange rate. Table 5 shows the estimated elasticities of the REER from its 
fundamental determinants.
5 According to the estimations, this approach shows no major 




Fundamental variable  Elasticity  
Net foreign liabilities / GDP  0.20 
Terms of trade  –0.24 
Trade liberalisation (exports and imports) / GDP   0.14 
Peruvian GDP / GDP of Peru’s trade partners  –0.30 
Public expenditure / GDP  –0.01 
Credit dollarisation ratio  0.08 
 
Graph 10 
Peru: behavioural equilibrium exchange rate  
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Concluding remarks  
The Central Reserve Bank of Peru has developed a policy framework based on a risk 
management approach. The vulnerabilities associated with the partial dollarisation of the 
banking system have been taken into account in order to incorporate unconventional policy 
tools like intervention in the foreign exchange market, the accumulation of international 
reserves, the application of different forms of reserve requirements and various types of 
liquidity sterilisation. With this policy framework, the Peruvian economy was relatively 
isolated from the effects of the global financial crisis and was able to return to growth with 
low inflation and to avoid major disruptions due to the surge in capital inflows.  
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